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THE SCOURGE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: FIGHTING BACK WITH A
LIBERALIZED CLASS ACTION VEHICLE
AND NOTICE PROVISION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's current statutory framework calls
for plaintiffs affirmatively to opt into a class action, while providing no notice provi-
sion to alert them of the existence of such a clasm This approach differs markedly
from the Rule 23 class action applicable to Title ViIlitigation. The legislative history
of the ADEA as well as the statutory evolution of the Rule 23 mechanism suggest that
the inclusion of the opt-in element and the exclusion of any notice provision are due
more to accident than to Congressional intent The author concludes that courts
should relax their strict interpretation of the ADEA, and Congress should incorporate
Rule 23"s procedure directly into the Act, so that the statutory intent to remedy perva-
sive age discrimination, which afflicts the workplace, may be realized
INTRODUCTION
The best is yet to be
The last of life, for which the first was made2
I have lived some thirty years on this planet, and I have yet to
hear the first syllable of valuable or even earnest advice from my
seniors. They have told me nothing and probably cannot tell me
anything to the purpose.2
AMERICA ALWAYS HAS had a dichotomous view of its older
citizens. On the one hand is the romanticized portrait of a
grandfather with his grandchildren flocked around him, eager to
hear some story of the past, better times, or of the elderly king,
sought out for his wisdom and compassion. A darker, lurking im-
age, however, is of the decrepit, venile man who meddles in other
peoples' affairs.
These conflicting portraits confuse the relation between "aging"
and "chronological aging," especially in the employment sector.3
1. R. Browning, "Rabbi Ben Ezra" st. I (1864).
2. H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN 9 (J. Shanley ed. 1971).
3. Chronological aging, or "years elapsed since birth," is to be distinguished from func-
tional, social, and reverse choronological aging. "Functional aging" refers to "rates of aging,
retention of skills, ability to learn and adapt.., and retention of stamina." "Social aging" is
the coined term for benefits like seniority rights. Finally, "reverse chronological aging" suc-
cinctly states that "[t]he further an individual moves from the year of his birth, the less
significant is that fact for the purposes of gauging functional capacity." Cain, Age Distinc-
tions and Their Social Functions: A Critique of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 57
CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 827, 829-30 (1981).
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"Aging refers to the regular changes that occur in mature geneti-
cally representative organisms living under representative environ-
mental conditions as they advance in chronological age." 4 Yet,
employers often establish arbitrary hiring and termination policies
based on chronological age without recognizing that aging is an in-
dividual process. This misconception belies the fact that:
Workers between 60 and 75 years of age are not only proving to
be capable of working in many occupations; they actually [ex-
ceed their younger counterparts] because of their superior judge-
ment, experience, and safety performance. Advances in
technology that have taken away much of the physical stress of
work tend in many instance [sic] to place a premium on the abili-
ties that many older workers possess.
While the Civil Rights Act of 19646 banned discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin, it made no men-
tion of age. Consequently, to combat widespread age discrimina-
tion in employment, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA")7 in 1967. The ADEA provides for a
private cause of action for age discrimination." Although the
ADEA claims the same overall purpose as Title VII, it implements
a very different procedural framework with respect to class actions
because it was derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA").9 While Rule 23(b)(3) class actions commonly used in
4. Birren & Renner, Research on the Psychology ofAging: Principles and Experimenta-
tion, in 3 HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 4 (1977).
5. AMERICAN MEDICAL AsS'N, EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PEOPLE 10 (n.d.)(pamphlet
published by AMA Committee on Aging), quoted in Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 859, 886 n.142 (1981). In fact, much literature exists refuting the
theory that "ability declines with age." See id. at 887.
6. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1983), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1983)).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes employment discrimination unlawful.
Among other things:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail to hire or
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin [ ].
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1983)).
7. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 1-16,
81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1983)).
8. The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a civil
action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief
as will effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA]." Id. § 633a(c).
9. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1983)).
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Title VII litigation permit opt-out and notice provisions,"° ADEA
class actions instead require opt-in filings without accommodating
the right to, or means for, notice of the pending suit.1 Further-
more, a litigant must fulfill complicated preliminary requirements
before pursuing an ADEA class action. As a result, class actions
tend to be very burdensome, as evidenced by the fact that approxi-
mately "two-thirds to one-half" of all ADEA lawsuits ified were
dismissed on procedural grounds during the first ten years of the
ADEA.12 The lack of prejudgment notice is especially harmful, for
in many cases employees are unaware not only of the existence of a
pending ADEA class action, but also of their substantive rights to
join the litigation. Such ignorance undermines the ADEA goal of
reducing arbitrary employment-related age discrimination.13
This Note has several aims. First, Title VII and the ADEA will
be compared. Second, relevant aspects of the ADEA will be evalu-
ated in light of Rule 23's requirements, legislative history, statutory
evolution, and judicial interpretation. Third, the harmful effect of
age discrimination in the private sector will be analyzed, giving rise
to legislation and judicial proposals to ease the procedural pitfalls of
the ADEA enforcement mechanism. 14
10. In Title VII litigation the alleged violator must be provided written notice, especially
when charges are filed against the government, a governmental agency, or a political subdivi-
sion. If the EEOC fails to secure a conciliation agreement, it may file a civil action with
aggrieved parties having the right to intervene. The EEOC must send notice to the claimant.
If the EEOC dismisses the claim or fails to enter a conciliation, the injured party, or any
party harmed by the filing, may bring a civil action. Because employment discrimination
outlawed by Title VII is a federal action, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally, and
Rule 23 particularly, are applicable. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1983);
see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
12. Reed, The First Ten Years of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 4 OHIO
N.U.L. REv. 748, 759 (1977). Frequently, cases will be decided according to whether the
litigants have complied with the notice and timing provisions of the ADEA. The courts are
also likely to judge the sufficiency of the evidence. Finally, many courts will defer to the
authority of state "conciliatory" agencies. See id.; see also infra notes 46-53 and accompany-
ing text.
13. See Note, Notice to Class Members Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Representa-
tive Action Provision, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 25, 37 (1983-84) [hereinafter Class Notice].
14. One leading age discrimination commentator has ruefully invoked the wisdom of the
mythical experienced litigator's advice to the novice:
If the law is against you, argue the facts. If the facts are against you, argue
congressional intent. If congressional intent is against you, argue dissenting opin-
ions in state court decisions, speeches inserted in the Congressional Record by a
single member of the House, or authorities that no longer exist. If these, too, are
unavailing, write law review articles.
Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57 CHI.[-]KENrT L. REv. 1029, 1029 (1981).
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I. OVERVIEW
A. The Civil Rights Act: Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1870'1 guarantees blacks the right to
contract and to possess and convey property, while the Civil Rights
Act of 187116 assures freedom from racial discrimination. By 1960,
however, Congress recognized that these Acts were not effectively
eliminating discrimination.17  Hence, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,18 which outlaws discrimination based on race,
religion, sex, and national origin. Title VII of the 1964 Act was
specifically targeted to alleviate employment discrimination. 19
Enforcement of Title VII primarily proceeds through private
civil suits recommended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to the Attorney General. 20 This use of repre-
sentative actions has increasingly become a crucial vehicle to
counteract the formidable power and resources of corporate and
government defendants. Unfortunately, Title VII does not explic-
itly sanction class actions as an enforcement mechanism. 21 Indeed,
15. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 1144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1983)).
16. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1983)). Congress sought to reach conspiracies with the Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1983)). Moreover, the Supreme
Court has interpreted § 1985(3)'s proscription against conspiracies to include those against
solely private parties. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
17. Reported the House Judiciary Committee: "[Notwithstanding some progress], in the
last decade it has become increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national
legislation is required to meet a national need which becomes ever more obvious." 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2391, 2393. See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EM-
PLOYMENT 1961 REPORT 103 (1961).
18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-18, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1983)) [hereinafter Title VII]. See also 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1983) (establishing unlawful employment practices).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6(a) (1983). In enacting Title VII, Congress considered
establishing a body similar to the National Labor Relations Board to investigate and prose-
cute discriminatory practices. Although the EEOC is empowered "to prevent any person
from engaging in any unlawful employment practice," it seems that Congress envisioned the
use of conciliatory actions to curb discriminatory practices. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), (b).
The legislative history indicates that Congress was fearful of giving overly broad enforcement
powers to the EEOC. See 110 CONG. REC. 1518, 1521 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler);
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 436-37 (1966); see
also Comment, Title VII Class Actions: A New Era?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 130, 133-35 (1983)
[hereinafter Title VII Class Actions]. Thus, by default, privately initiated litigation is the
principal vehicle for Title VII enforcement.
21. Professor Rutherglen suggests that:
Class actions escaped congressional notice in part because they did not attain
prominence until the 1966 revision of Rule 23, but more significantly, because Con-
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a House amendment of Title VII in 1971 tried to prohibit class ac-
tions.22 The final report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee, nonetheless, rejected the House's class action prohibi-
tion, thereby agreeing "with the courts that Title VII actions are by
their very nature class complaints, and that any restrictions on such
actions would greatly undermine the effectiveness of Title VII."23
When the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197224 gave the
EEOC power to sue and extended Title VII coverage, it neither
mentioned class actions nor restricted their use.25
Courts have been more supportive of the use of class actions to
enforce Title VII. For example, in Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 26 the
court extended the customary judicial doctrine, which allowed class
actions to challenge facially discriminatory employer practices, to
include complaints where the action is not pursuant to an estab-
lished policy of discrimination.27 The court explicitly held that "ra-
cial discrimination is by definition class discrimination. If it exists,
it applies through the class."' 28  The various circuit courts have
since expanded the limits of the Hall doctrine.29 Given this legisla-
tive deference and judicial pastorship, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
gress expressly dealt with the issue of classwide litigation by granting authority to
the Attorney General to bring pattern-or-practice actions. Congress also denied
authority to private persons to file administrative charges on behalf of others, sug-
gesting that, far from endorsing class action, it intended at that time to preclude
private authority to litigate on behalf of others.
Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 692-96 (1980) (footnotes omit-
ted). See Title VII Class Actions, supra note 20, at 134.
22. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § (e) (1971).
23. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1972), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1972).
24. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 1-7, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1983)).
25. Explained Senator Harrison Williams:
[I]t is not intended that any of the provisions contained therein are designed to
affect the present use of class action lawsuits Vnder Title VII in conjunction with
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... [L]eading cases in this area to
date have recognized that Title VII claims are necessary class action complaints and
that, accordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to relief under the
claim be named in the original charge or in the claim for relief.
118 CONG. REc. 4942 (1972) (explaining S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which author-
ized private individuals to file a discrimination complaint for an injured person). See Title
VII Class Actions, supra note 20, at 135. The EEOC's power has been severely curtailed.
26. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). See infra note 68.
27. Hall, 251 F. Supp. at 186.
28. Id. See Title VII Class Actions, supra note 20, at 137.
29. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of Civil Procedure30 has become the primary weapon for fighting
race and sex discrimination in the workplace.
To maintain a class action under the Federal Rules, the class
must be certified, meaning that several prerequisites must first be
fulfilled before it may be maintained. First, the plaintiffs seeking
representation in the class must be too numerous to sustain multiple
individual actions.3' Second, there must be common questions of
law and fact within the class. 32 Third, the representative's cause of
action must be typical of the class' complaint.33 Finally, the repre-
sentative must have the best interests of the class in mind, and the
ability to represent fairly the class members' grievances.3 4 Courts
will go to great lengths to ensure that this final criterion is met,
because a judgement under Rule 23 binds all class members.
Once these prerequisites are met, the class must fit into one of
three categories. Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes cover situations
30.
Rule 23. Class Actions.
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b).
31. Id 23(a).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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where individual suits might create inconsistent judgments, or the
defendant has limited financial resources, or injunctive or declara-
tory relief is sought.3" The 23(b)(3) class action (the workhorse of
Title VII suits) is appropriate when questions of law and fact con-
cerning the class predominate over those concerning individuals,
and the class action is the superior method of adjudication. 36 Po-
tential party plaintiffs start out as members of the Rule 23 class;
however, the rule allows eligible members to opt out and sue indi-
vidually without the burden of resjudicata being applied from the
class suit's outcome.
B. ADEA Procedural Requirements
The ADEA theoretically encourages employment of older
Americans based on their abilities. This goal is promoted by pro-
viding education and information to resolve employment problems.
The information also dispels unfounded beliefs underlying age dis-
crimination. Furthermore, the ADEA provides remedial proce-
dures to rectify ongoing discrimination, resulting from failures of
the ADEA provisions. 37 The ADEA applies to employers engaged
in interstate commerce with at least twenty employees, 38 employ-
ment agencies,39 and labor unions.' It protects workers between
forty and seventy years of age.41 Under the ADEA, an employer
may not, among other things, fail or refuse to hire, or discharge an
employee due to age,42 reduce his wages and benefits due to age,43
or state an age preference in classified advertisements.'
An integral premise of the ADEA was Congress' naive notion
that age discrimination in employment, unlike other forms of dis-
crimination, is due to a lack of information rather than malicious
intent. 5 Congress believed that if the ADEA successfully "edu-
cated" employers about older workers' competence, discrimination
would be eliminated. To hasten the elimination of employment age
discrimination, Congress specified a series of procedures for the em-
35. Id 23(b)(1) & (b)(2).
36. Id 23(b)(3).
37. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 630(b) (1983).
39. Id. § 623(b).
40. Id. § 623(c).
41. Id § 631(a).
42. Id. § 623(a)(1).
43. Id. § 623(a)(3).
44. Id. § 623(e).
45. 113 CONG. REc. 34,742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Burke).
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ployee to follow for redress. First, the aggrieved employee must file
a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimina-
tory incident. Private litigation may not commence until 60 days
after a charge has been filed. During this 60-day period, the Labor
Department is required to approach the defendant-employer and at-
tempt to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by "informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion."46 A second
requirement is that the litigant must bring suit within the two-year
statute of limitations period. 7 The statute of limitations will be
tolled for up to one year during the conciliation process.48 How-
ever, if the EEOC decides to file its own suit, any private right to
sue terminates. 49
Unfortunately, these procedures provide pitfalls for the unwary
employee.5 ° The most onerous requirement has been the 180-day
filing requirement. 1 The one-year tolling of the statute of limita-
tions is additionally burdensome for litigants because the Labor De-
partment's conciliation process may take longer.5 2  These
complexities have resulted in dismissal of up to fifty percent of all
ADEA lawsuits. 3
The employee's case is further complicated by the many statu-
tory defenses that the employer may plead. Under section 623(f),
the employer is exempt from suit if the employment practices are
46. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1983).
47. Id. § 255(a).
48. Id. § 626(e). For willful violations, the statute of limitations is increased to three
years. Id. § 255(a).
49. Id. § 626(c)(1).
50. See Sheeder, Procedural Complexity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
An Age-Old Problem, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 241 (1980); see also Comment, Procedural Aspects of
the Age Discrimination In Employment Act of1967, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 914 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Procedural Aspects] (generally discussing ADEA procedural requirements, and specifi-
cally discussing the filing and notice provisions).
51. The old adage that "at some point age is correlative with ability" cuts two ways.
Often it is hard in the larger, impersonal work setting for a laid-off employee to realize that he
is a victim of age discrimination. Of course, an individual who is refused a job may never find
out the employer's true motivation, at least not until after the 180 days have passed. Indeed,
during the 1978 amendment process, the Senate committee suggested a removal of this 180
day filing requirement. Unfortunately, the House bill carried no comparable provision. Act
of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 189. Note
that some commentators interpret the filing requirement as procedural rather than as juris-
dictional to get around this problem. See Note, Age Discrimination and the Over Sixty-Five
Worker, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 333-45 (1972) [hereinafter Over Sixty-Five].
52. Indeed, in extreme cases, courts have ruled that failure by the department ade-
quately to promote conciliation is grounds for dismissal of the employee's private suit. Proce-
dural Aspects, supra note 50, at 928-29.
53. See Reed, supra note 12.
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based on reasonable factors other than age,54 bona fide occupational
qualifications (BFOQ), 5 bona fide seniority systems, and employee
benefit plans.56 Moreover, there is a "good faith" exception for em-
ployers who rely on regulations, administrative practices, or en-
forcement policies later "modified, rescinded, or determined to be
invalid."5" Should the employee manage to comply with these pro-
cedures, he may receive back pay, front pay, liquidated damages
(perhaps including punitive damages), 8 and attorneys' fees. How-
ever, any damage award must be mitigated by the employee. 9
The most imposing procedural obstacle is the ADEA's specific
adoption of the FLSA's enforcement mechanism for maintenance of
class actions.' Under the FLSA, a class action may be brought by
one or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves and all
other employees similarly situated. However, no employee may be
a party plaintiff in the class action unless he files his written consent
to join the class in the specific court hearing the suit.61 This is com-
monly called the 'opt-in' requirement. Unlike Rule 23 classes shar-
ing common questions of law and fact, the ADEA class action can
only remedy the age discrimination felt by those who know of the
54. Governmental regulations have defined four narrow examples of reasonable factors
other than age: (1) physical fitness requirements which are reasonably required by the spe-
cific work to be performed; (2) evaluation factors such as production quantity or quality, or
educational level having a valid relation to the specific job; (3) the employer's conditions as to
the number or schedule of hours; and (4) a policy against nepotism. 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1985).
See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Under Federal Law, 9 GA. ST. B. J. 114, 122
(1972).
55. Bona fide occupational qualifications recognize that age is, to some degree, related to
occupational qualifications. Examples include age limitations for the safety and convenience
of the public (e.g., airline pilots), and special, individual occupational circumstances (e.g.,
actors needed because of their youthful or elderly appearance). 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d)
(1985). But in typical situations, it is preferable to utilize individual testing than to attribute
an arbitrary age limit to a BFOQ. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 407 (1976) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
56. While a seniority system may be qualified by such factors as merit, capacity, or
ability, length of service must be the primary criterion. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1985). In
pension plans, the employer must expend the same amount of money on all its employees,
although younger workers may realize larger benefits due to rate structures. Id. § 860.120(a).
57. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 258 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reported
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2213, 2218.
58. Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Thuston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985) (holding that Congress
intended liquidated damages to be punitive in nature).
59. No circuit has granted compensation for pain and suffering. See Nosier & Wing,
Remedies Under the FederalAge Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 469-
84 (1985).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1983).
61. Id. § 216(b).
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class' existence and affirmatively join the litigation. This is a much
more restrictive approach than that adopted by Rule 23 class
actions.62
62. This Note will but momentarily dwell upon a nonprocedural problem of the ADEA:
the acceptance of mandatory retirement policies. The Labor Department, in 1965, found that
companies hired negligible numbers of older workers. Indeed, only 6.9% of the hiring needs
of companies with maximum age limits went to employees age 45 and over, compared with
13% for those firms with no age limit. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 7 (1965) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S RE-
PORT]. Even some county governments administering public service employment programs
had mandatory retirement ages of 65. This, of course, also hurt those approaching the age 65
limit. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY 65 (1977) [here-
inafter CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N].
The 1967 version of ADEA only protected employees up to the age of 65. The origin of
65 as a retirement age is the old age insurance legislation of Otto Von Bismarck, enacted
when the average life expectancy in Germany was only 35 years. Agatstein, TheAge Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19 N.Y.L. FORUM 309, 322 (1973-74). But,
current life expectancy has reached 73.2 years, and people reaching age 65 can expect to live
another 16.3 years. As of 1980, 11% (24 million people) of the American population was age
65 or older; by the year 2030, the same figure will reach 20% (55 million). How Old is
"Old?" The Effects of Aging on Learning and Working: Hearings Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
No profession, industry, business, craft, or trade organization before 1860 required people
to leave the labor force because they had reached a predetermined, chronological age. W.A.
ACHENBAUM, OLD AGE IN THE NEw LAND 22 (1978) [hereinafter OLD AGE]. Yet, there
were exceptions in the public sector. The New York Constitution, for example, required
judges to retire at age 60. This constitutional requirement forced Chancellor James Kent to
resign in 1823 amid great uproar. Three years later, he began to publish his famous Com-
mentaries on American Law (1826-1830), establishing himself as the American Blackstone.
Kent did not become infirm until a few months before his death at age 84. OLD AGE, supra,
at 21. Such an example shows the hazards and unfairness of using chronological age to
denote merit.
The trend toward corporate mandatory retirement ages accelerated when President Lyn-
don Johnson's Social Security system penalized eligible persons who chose to work, and ex-
tended coverage to encourage corporate retirement programs integrated with Social Security
eligibility. In addition, rising Social Security benefits made retirement more attractive. W.A.
ACHENBAUM, SHADES OF GRAY: OLD AGE, AMERICAN VALUES, AND FEDERAL POLICIES
SINCE 1920, at 102 (1983) [hereinafter SHADES OF GRAY]. Even though Congress felt that
retirement at age 65 would be popular:
[T]here was a growing awareness in the 1960's that encouraging or enforcing
leisure for the aged might be deleterious to society in general and to the elderly in
particular. Officials were accused of inducing the old to retire or, worse, of reclassi-
fying older unemployed workers as retired in order to alleviate current unemploy-
ment problems. By confusing retirement policy with unemployment policy, argued
Duke economist Juanita Kreps, Americans were ensuring the creation of a large
class of aged poor in the future, men and women who would have to survive on
meager private resources and insufficient benefits based on their decision to take
early retirement.
Id.
Recent surveys in 1978 and 1981 have indicated that more than half of current retirees
and workers approaching retirement wish to continue working after retiring. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ADEA STUDIES 22 (1982). One way around a
mandatory retirement policy is for companies to offer early retirement benefits. A recent
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C. Differences Between the ADEA and Title VII
Although Title VII and the ADEA include the same prohibi-
tory language,63 there are statutory differences besides the permissi-
ble class action mechanisms. For example, the ADEA has the
BFOQ, bona fide seniority or employee benefits plan, and good faith
exceptions. Title VII, on the other hand, not only does not include
the ADEA's statutory good faith exception, but also imposes
greater burdens of proof for the other two exceptions. Further-
more, ADEA actions enjoy jury trials and legal damages, while Ti-
tle VII litigation does not.' Moreover, courts have declined to shift
the burden of proof to ADEA defendants as they would in Title VII
cases, forcing the plaintiff to prove his claim of unlawful discharge
based on age.65 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons66
specifically recognized significant differences between the two Acts.
study showed that approximately 14% of all older workers either have received or may re-
ceive encouragement to retire early. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS
OF ADEA STuDIEs 100 (1981) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. More than 55% of employ-
ees on average retire by age 62, suggesting a strong trend toward pension acceptance. Id. at
95. However voluntary the acceptance of early retirement may be, employees often find out
too late that what once appeared to be a nest egg has become an empty nest, for persistent
inflation has a devastating impact on the worth of one's retirement assets. For example, at an
annual inflation rate of 12%, a pension loses two-thirds of its value in ten years, and 90%
after twenty years. "Only those who can depend on inherited wealth, exceptionally shrewd
investments, and exceedingly generous compensation from prior employment can count on
having funds that will last until a retired worker and his or her spouse die." SHADES OF
GRAY, supra, at 156.
It is true that the ADEA's upper age limit was increased to 70 in 1978. It is, however,
inconsistent that government should argue for an individual to be judged on merit until age
70, while simultaneously accepting the proposition that all individuals over 70 are presumed
incapable of remaining on the work force, thereby being denied the ADEA's protection. Le-
vien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Devel-
opments, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 227, 230 (1974). However difficult it may be to determine fitness
in individual instances, a "merit" system would be more just than arbitrary mandatory retire-
ment rules. If a young person must walt slightly longer for promotion, then he will in turn be
protected as he ages. Self-employed individuals have long shown their productivity in their
seventies and beyond. Agatstein, supra, at 322. Given the BFOQ and "reasonable factors
other than age" defenses, there is no reason to deny employees the Act's protection when
they turn 70.
63. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1983). See Comment, Coming ofAge: Unique and Independ-
ent Treatment of the ADEA, 7 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 583, 585-86 (1983-84) [hereinafter
Coming ofAge].
65. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff must satisfy
his burden of production by establishing his class membership and job qualifications);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Harvard Note, supra
note 55, at 388-99. In Title VII cases, much debate surrounds the precise nature ofthe burden
which has shifted to the defendant. Although Green may be read as shifting only the burden
of production, in general, the federal courts of appeals considering this issue have interpreted
Green as shifting the entire burden of persuasion. Id. at 389. The confusion about whether
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The provisions of the ADEA should be examined and analyzed
in light of its separate and independent existence from Title VII,
avoiding automatic incorporation of Title VII precedents into the
ADEA.67 However, the differences between the two class action
vehicles may be the result of accident rather than congressional
intent.68
the ADEA adopts the same procedures and burdens of proof as Title VII was unfortunately
intensified by Green. Id. at 390.
66. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
67. See Coming of Age, supra note 64, at 588-89; Liddle, Disparate Treatment Claims
Under ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J.
549, 550 (1979); McKenry, Enforcement ofAge Discrimination in Employment Legislation, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 1157 (1981).
68. Much has been made of the Supreme Court's recent Title VII restrictions on the use
of class actions. In the earliest reported decision addressing use of class actions in Title VII
litigation, a Tennessee district court established a pair of widely accepted principles. First, an
individual who has exhausted his administrative remedies may properly represent a class
composed of individuals that have not done so. Second, "racial discrimination is by defini-
tion a class discrimination." Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186, 188 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966). Given this background, the Fifth Circuit fashioned its "across-the-board rule"
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). In this case, a
discharged black worker sought to represent a class that included current black employees.
Rejecting the defendant's commonality and typicality objections, the court ruled that the
"Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] is a
question of fact common to all members of the class," and that plaintiff's race and allegations
of racial discrimination alone assured that his claim was typical of the class' claims. Id. at
1124.
Alarmed by the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits' adoption of this "across-
the-board" approach, the Supreme Court tried to slow the momentum behind this class liber-
alization. In East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), the Court
denied that plaintiff local driver, who alleged injury by defendant's requirement that a local
driver resign from the company and forfeit his seniority right in order to apply for a job as a
company intercity driver, could adequately represent a class comprised of all defendant's
black and Hispanic local drivers, because he was obviously unqualified for the intercity driver
position. "Careful attention to the requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23]
remains.., indispensable." Id. at 401, 405. Next, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147 (1982), the Court faced a plaintiff alleging discriminatory promotion, who sought to
represent all Mexican Americans either currently employed, or who had not been hired by
the defendant. The Court struck down the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board approach, refus-
ing to presume satisfaction of the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
requirements without a specific showing by plaintiff. Id. at 160. The simple axiom that racial
discrimination constitutes class discrimination was not enough. See Note, General Tele-
phone Co. v. Falcon: Cutting Back Class Actions in Title VII Suits, 34 ALA. L. REV. 317
(1983); Title VII Class Actions, supra note 20, at 130-56.
While these two Supreme Court decisions may have reduced the settlement values of Title
VII class actions, they do not fully restrict Rule 23's use. Instead, the Court merely reiter-
ated the requirements of Rule 23(a). In discrimination cases, there is usually a typical class
with a common problem, so plaintiff's attorneys will simply have to a make a greater showing
in their certification briefs. The Supreme Court's position neither shows disenchantment
with the class action for enforcing remedial legislation nor facilitates satisfaction of the
ADEA's opt-in requirement.
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II. CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23 AND THE ADEA
Class actions play a myriad of roles in today's society. They
deter unfair or illegal business and government practices, recover
profits unjustly realized, and compensate victims. Furthermore, the
size and scope of relief may vary considerably. For example, an
antitrust class action may redress millions of customers, each with a
claim of only a few dollars, while an employment discrimination
suit may be brought on behalf of fewer than one hundred employ-
ees, each having a claim for a considerable amount of back pay and
demanding changes in hiring and promotion practices.69 The class
action mechanism, as used to litigate complex and extensive
problems, is a powerful tool and one inherently necessary to combat
the institutional evils of age discrimination in the job market.
A. The Need For Class Actions
The EEOC receives some 9,100 employment-related age dis-
crimination charges each year;7" yet, the ADEA only requires that
the EEOC promptly notify putative defendants, and that the parties
attempt to settle the dispute through informal and voluntary negoti-
ations. Unlike Title VII cases, the EEOC is not required to investi-
gate the charge.71 The Commission uses a factfinding process,
which combines investigative and settlement techniques, to resolve
quickly as many disputes as possible. This system also generates
information for determining whether further investigation is appro-
priate. The EEOC tries to process eighty percent of its ADEA
cases in factfinding within 150 days,72 with "settlement rates run-
ning at approximately 23 percent.
'7 3
Factfinding is usually appropriate for cases affecting only a few
individuals, which can be finally reconciled through "face-to-face
confrontation."'7 Full investigations, in contrast, are used where
there are many alleged victims, extensive relief is sought, or the
EEOC has already marked the industry or issue for review.7 ' How-
ever, because of limited resources, the EEOC is able to investigate
69. Comment, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair" with National
Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1487, 1487 (1984) [hereinafter National Classes].
70. See EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT: 1979-1982 (AN INFORMATION PAPER PREPARED FOR THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
ON AGING) 109, app. XV (1982) [hereinafter INFORMATION PAPER].
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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fully a mere twenty percent of its ADEA cases.76
In 1981 the EEOC filed 89 lawsuits.77 In the next three years,
the number of suits dropped to 28, 33, and 67 before climbing back
to 96 in 1985.78 Of the 96 suits in 1985, approximately 65 were
class actions. 79 Because the EEOC can file so few suits,80 most em-
ployees must pursue their own litigation. The complexity, uncer-
tainty, and litigation costs for unsettled and complicated issues act
as a disincentive to private enforcement.8 " Thus, the accessibility of
class actions would help the EEOC increase the scale of its opera-
tions, and aid employees who must bear high attorneys' fees and
discovery costs of any suits which they bring.
To be sure, there are some potential disadvantages to represen-
tative actions. Size is one, but the judge may consider this factor
before certifying a 23(b)(3) class.82 If the legal representation is in-
adequate, a class member, under Rule 23, may directly or collater-
ally attack the results, releasing the challenging party from its
binding effect.8 3 Should the intellectual or physical capacity of the
class members be so different that adequate representation is impos-
sible, the judgement would not be binding. This is also a certifica-
tion question for the judge to handle under the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites.
76. Id. at 28. In part, the Commission has chosen to focus its resources on individual
charge resolution as opposed to more extensive investigation of a more limited number of
charges. Id. at 27-28.
The EEOC also has a procedure called "settlement attempt only," which is used in those
cases where it is clear that there is no violation, the grievant absolutely intends to file a
private action, and the relief sought is either so excessive or minimal as to be administratively
impractical to receive more than minimal EEOC effort. Id. This is the minimal level of
EEOC action.
77. Telephone Interview with Nancy Fried, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor
(Jan. 9, 1986).
78. Id.
79. Id. The fact that two-thirds of this litigation is class oriented is probably due to the
EEOC's greater allocation of full investigations to complaints involving large numbers of
plaintiffs. A full investigation must occur before the Commission will decide to file a com-
plaint in court. Furthermore, most of these class actions were against public agencies and
state and local governments, and no "opt in" is required for actions against the federal gov-
ernment. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1983). See Moysey v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C.
1979). Finally, the 65 class actions have only been filed; they have yet to survive the certifica-
tion process.
80. The EEOC expected a backlog of over 4,000 cases in 1980, for example. EEOC
Enforcement of the ADEA: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 102 (1980) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement].
81. See INFORMATION PAPER, supra note 70, at 54.
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
83. See Kamp, Civil Procedure in the Class Action Mode, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
401, 403-04 (1983).
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There are clear advantages to using class actions, not only to the
parties and judge, but also to society. Class actions are an efficient
means of adjudication. By allowing thousands of lawsuits to be
handled as a unit, overcrowded dockets will be cleared.8 4 More-
over, they frequently facilitate litigation that otherwise would not
be brought.8" Not only can plaintiffs pool discovery costs, they can
get attorneys' fees under the "common fund doctrine. '86 This ob-
vious benefit to plaintiffs also aids society's inherent interest in see-
ing alleged injuries decided on their merits, not on the basis of the
plaintiff's financial resources.
Class actions also allow the judge to become an active partici-
pant in the proceedings. He is responsible for overseeing settle-
ments, giving discretionary notice, and assuring adequate legal
representation. 7 Such activism promotes the achievement of sub-
stantive goals. Furthermore, injunctive and monetary relief in class
actions work to enforce substantive policies to a greater degree than
individual suits. The aggregation of legal damages, for instance, ar-
guably deters defendants from engaging in illegal activities like age
discrimination. Injunctions are also a powerful tool, because of the
availability of contempt sanctions.88
Title VII discrimination cases have used both pattern-or-prac-
tice theory and disparate impact theory to attack employment prac-
tices which affect large groups of people.8 9 The EEOC, however,
has specifically approved only the use of practice theory in age dis-
crimination cases.90 Because a group of plaintiffs is needed, no dis-
parate impact analysis is practical without resort to class actions.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that one individual, allegedly victimized
by age discrimination and probably also unemployed, could compile
and analyze the requisite evidence; consequently, the availability of
a class action is essential to spread costs of such litigation, which
84. Id. at 409.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 411-12.
87. Eg., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976).
88. Kamp, supra note 83, at 413-14.
89. Disparate impact cases do not require a showing of discriminatory intent. In pat-
tern-or-practice cases, intent may be inferred from evidence of statistically significant discrep-
ancies in the employment pattern. See Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-in to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act through the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 71 GEO. L.J. 119, 151-52 (1982).
90. Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1052 (1984) [hereinafter Disparate Impact Analysis]. The EEOC also
utilizes disparate treatment in age discrimination cases. Id.
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will ultimately be recovered should the class prevail.9" It is also
more difficult for the employer to bring forth evidence to prove
either a BFOQ or a "reasonable factor other than age" defense
against an employee class than it would be against a single
employee. 92
Even defendants stand to gain from class actions. Judges may
be reluctant to grant injunctive and declaratory relief if a large
number of plaintiffs seek reinstatement to positions held by new em-
ployees. The upheaval might be too great.93 Moreover, by reducing
the probability of multiple suits, the defendant need face fewer un-
predictable juries. If a defendant loses one suit, other plaintiffs may
be able to assert offensive collateral estoppel to prevail in their own
actions.
Thus, the easier availability of class actions would help handle
the steady influx of class complaints, and allow a poor, unemployed
plaintiff-employee the opportunity to adjudicate his rights. The
ADEA's opt-in requirement, however, effectively prevents the use
of class actions, enabling employers to frustrate the remedial goals
of the ADEA. Because age discrimination is as prevalent and
debilitating as race and gender discrimination, older workers de-
serve access to the Rule 23 class action mode enjoyed by blacks and
women under Title VII.94 Otherwise, they are receiving unequal
treatment in confronting an equally harmful stereotype.
B. The Opt-In Requirement
1. Legislative History
Presumably Congress had some reason for incorporating the
FLSA enforcement procedures into the ADEA, but the legislative
history, discerned from both the House and Senate reports, is re-
markably silent. Indeed, the most important issue discussed was
the need for an age discrimination law; little attention, if any, was
focused on the ADEA's statutory scheme.9
5
91. Spahn, supra note 89, at 152.
92. Lipschultz, The Class Action Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Current Status, Controversies, and Suggested Clarification, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1381
(1981).
93. See Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63
B.U.L. REV. 597, 597-601 (1983).
94. But see Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1029 (1981).
95. The retirement age range of 32 to 35 for female flight attendants was also debated,
because Congress felt that this limitation was arbitrarily and subjectively based on physical
attraction. No other action to protect the attendants was taken for fear of delaying the pro-
tection of the 40 million employees between the ages 40 and 65. 113 CONG. REc. 31,253
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Various reasons can be suggested for Congress' adoption of the
FLSA mechanism. First, Congress may have assumed that there
would be little need for private suits. As Senator Yarborough
noted:
While the bill includes enforcement procedures which are
adopted from the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is the hope of the
sponsors of this legislation that such procedures will not be
needed very often. Rather, it is the fact that our national policy
as declared by this bill will be to stop invidious distinctions in
employment because of age. Everyone who testified at our hear-
ings felt that the greatest need in this area was to educate em-
ployers to the facts-facts which show that older workers are at
least as productive as younger workers and that on average they
stay with their employers for a longer period of time .... It will
be the major job of the Department of Labor under this bill to
educate the country to the fact that older workers are just as
capable employees as younger workers.96
Given the large number of age discrimination complaints since
Congress adopted the ADEA, this educational process appears to
be ineffective.
Originally the ADEA was to use agency-sponsored enforce-
ment, with hearings before the Secretary of Labor and a right of
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. This framework would have
required a separate bureaucracy within the Department of Labor.
Because the EEOC was overextended handling Title VII claims,
Congress decided to have ADEA and Title VII claims separately
administered. Consequently, Congress adopted enforcement tech-
niques for the ADEA that were directly analogous to those of the
FLSA.97 It was felt that such a course would "cause the least anxi-
ety to businessmen, yet provide complete fairness to employees. ' '98
Indeed, Senator Javits had already tried to amend a FLSA bill ear-
lier in 1967 to ban age discrimination. The amendment would have
utilized the "existing investigative and enforcement machinery of
the Wage and Hour Division into which the functions of adminis-
tration and enforcement of a ban on age discrimination could easily
have been integrated."9 9 A similar precedent had already been es-
tablished for the Equal Pay Amendment to the FLSA, prohibiting
(1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough). Apparently, concentrating on the plight of female
flight attendants suffering demeaning discrimination would be viewed by constituents as a
better use of the representatives' time than would a "simple" procedural alteration.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. See Harvard Note, supra note 55, at 381.
98. 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
99. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
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wage discrimination based on sex. When this amendment failed, it
was only natural for Senator Javits to try to install the same provi-
sion within the ADEA bill.
If Congress' primary consideration was bureaucratic efficiency,
Rule 23 class actions should have been whole-heartedly embraced.
Rule 23 class actions were not accepted, but only because Congress
wanted to use the existing governmental divisions of the FLSA.
Congress' lack of hostile intent towards Rule 23 class actions is fur-
ther suggested by Congress' belief that private litigation would be
unnecessary. 1°° However, the FLSA significantly differs from the
ADEA in that the FLSA was designed to combat unfair working
conditions in the workshop, not employer hiring and dismissal deci-
sions based on age. Workers complaining about unfair working
conditions under the FLSA would still be employed, and therefore
would have a better opportunity to learn of forthcoming class ac-
tions to join.
There is one other possible explanation for Congress' incorpora-
tion of the FLSA mechanism. The revised Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1966 were written by an advisory committee under the
authority of the Supreme Court. Although the Rules were enacted
by Congress, they did not necessarily engender much Congressional
debate. Prior to the 1966 revision, the Rule 23 class action required
all members to opt in; however, the Rules were changed in 1966 to
accommodate all potential plaintiffs. Since the ADEA was enacted
less than one year after the revision, Congress may not have realized
the consequences of incorporating an opt-in requirement into the
ADEA. If one accepts that the opt-in adoption was unintentional,
and that age discrimination is both as prevalent and as debilitating
as other forms of discrimination, a change in the language of
ADEA section 216 and in judicial interpretation to grant older
workers the advantages of a Rule 23 class action would not only
comport with the legislative intent behind the ADEA, but also bet-
ter effectuate the remedial purposes underlying the ADEA.
2. Statutory Evolution of the ADEA
Equally convincing arguments may be made for the proposition
that the opt-in requirement's inclusion in the FLSA in the first
100. Ironically, a survey by the Department of Labor of the twenty-four states having age
discrimination legislation in 1967 concluded that vigorous enforcement provisions were nec-
essary to eliminate discrimination in supplement to "promotion, education and persuasion."
H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967).
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place was accidental, as contended by one commentator. 101 The
1938 version of the FLSA provided for three types of private action.
An employee could sue as an individual, on behalf of himself and
similarly situated employees, or through an agent maintaining the
action for all employees similarly situated."0 2 This designated agent
suit was an innovation.
10 3
In contrast to the 1938 version of the FLSA, the 1938 version of
Rule 23 contained the "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" categories
of class action."° The "true" class was inapplicable to the FLSA,
because it arose when the character of the right sought to be en-
forced was joint, common, or secondary, and unless class actions
were allowed, joinder of all parties would be necessary.10 5 Because
FLSA section 216(b) allows individual employees to enforce their
rights under the Act, however, joinder would never be necessary.
The "hybrid" class action was also inappropriate for FLSA en-
forcement because the right sought to be enforced had to be several
and relate to specific property. 106 Therefore, if Rule 23 were to gov-
ern employee suits arising under the FLSA, such suits had to arise
as "spurious" class actions, involving common questions of law or
fact affecting the several rights sued upon, and bind those before the
court and any voluntary intervenors. 107 The FLSA employee suit,
101. See Spahn, supra note 89.
102. See supra note 9, § 16(b). Section 16(b) of the FLSA originally provided:
An action to recover [unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation] may be
maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or
such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain
such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated.
Id.
103. Spahn, supra note 89, at 124-25.
104. The original rule read:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes enti-
tled to enforce it; or
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
3B J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01[l.-1] (2d
ed. 1985) [hereinafter MOORE].
105. A "true" class judgment was binding on the class. Id. at 1 23.11 [5].
106. A "hybrid" class judgment would bind all parties and privies and all claims, whether
presented in the proceedings or not, which might affect specific property. Id.
107. Id. at 23.11[3]. Even though nonparties were not bound, judgment still had stare
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therefore, was at heart a permissive joinder device.
Problems quickly developed with the FLSA, however. The Act
required employers to compensate their employees at least at the
minimum wage rate, and to pay overtime for work exceeding forty
hours, but it never defined the term "work." Questions arose, par-
ticularly with respect to miners: did work commence at the en-
trance of the mine, or at the actual drilling site deep within the
shaft? The Supreme Court ruled for the former in Tennessee Coal,
Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local 123,08 deciding that the
owners must pay employees for the time spent traveling from the
"portal" (entrance) of the mine to the "working face" (drilling site)
and back again, as well as the time spent at the working face (hence,
the term "portal-to-portal"). 10 9
Naturally, this decision was applied to any factory job site.
Since there was no statute of limitations in the 1938 FLSA, employ-
ees were able to file claims for years of traveling to and from their
worksites. Furthermore, wartime production during World War II
kept workers busy at inflated regular wages and excessive overtime
hours. The combined result of the Court's decision and lack of any
statute of limitations was staggering. The number of portal-to-por-
tal cases filed in the United States district courts from July 1, 1946
to January 21, 1947 was 1,913; 1,515 of these cases asked for ap-
proximately $5.8 billion in unpaid minimum wages and overtime
compensation.' 10 At times, the requested relief exceeded the em-
ployer's working capital, and, in several instances, the relief sought
surpassed the firm's entire net worth.'11 Congress feared that such
large claims might retard the financial positions and future expan-
sion plans of the firms, as well as swamp employers with paperwork
if they had to maintain detailed compensation records for employee
travel time. t2 Moreover, because most of the defense contracts
signed with the government were on a "cost plus fixed fee" basis,
decisis value. See generally Spahn, supra note 89, at 126-28 ("spurious" class actions, under
the 1938 Rules, bound only those opting into the class).
108. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
109. Id. at 597-99.
110. S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947) (letter from Henry Chandler) [herein-
after SENATE REPORT].
11. Id. at 25. For example, the steel industry faced approximately $I billion in portal-
to-portal claims, surpassing the entire net earnings of all the companies in that industry from
1942 to 1946. Id. at 26. The aircraft industry faced $461 million in portal-to-portal claims,
but it only had $366 million in net current assets, with a net worth of only $423 million.
These claims were primarily for wartime work where the number of employees had increased
from 48,639 to 1,250,000 over a five year period. Id. at 29.
112. Id. at 27-29.
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the potential government liability stemming from portal-to-portal
claims could be immense.' 13 This liability, combined with the busi-
ness deductions for reasonable employee salaries, meant the Treas-
ury Department stood to lose between $1.21 billion and $1.43
billion in revenues. 14
Congress acted quickly by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947.115 Section 4 stipulated that "walking, riding, or traveling to
and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity
within the employer's plant, mine, building, etc. is not compensable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act."' 16 Section 6 added the two-
year statute of limitations for filing claims. 17 Unfortunately, Con-
gress also amended section 16(b) of the FLSA by abolishing the
representative class action and adding the opt-in requirement," 8
further reducing potential FLSA claims. Although nothing in the
legislative history indicates why Congress added this opt-in ele-
ment, it presumably feared that labor unions would file large claims
for all of their members. Since the portal-to-portal claim itself had
already been abolished under section 4, the opt-in requirement
seems to be an example of Congress overreacting to a perceived
problem.
In 1966, the Advisory Committee, under the Supreme Court's
authority, completely overhauled Rule 23.119 Rather than maintain
the consent theory of class actions, whereby plaintiffs must affirma-
tively opt into the class, the Committee adopted the congruance
theory in which representatives and other class members must have
the same interests. This theory is visible in the Rule 23(a) safe-
guards which ensure a close match between the interests of the rep-
113. Id at 32-33. The government could be responsible for the contractor's litigation
costs because it becomes a "product" cost reimbursable under "cost plus fixed fee" contracts.
114. Id. at 33.
115. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, §§ 1-15, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-62 (1983)).
116. Id. §4.
117. Id. §6.
118. Id. § 5(d):
The second sentence of § 16(b). .. is amended to read as follows: 'Action to re-
cover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent
isfiled in the court in which such action is brought.' (emphasis added).
119. MOORE, supra note 104, at t 23.01[8]. Although the drafters of Rule 23(a) believed
the described forms of class actions comported with prevailing practice, "the terms joint,'
.common,' etc.... proved obscure and uncertain." Id.
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resentative and the class members. 20 The consent theory was
demoted to the Rule 23(b)(3) class and incorporated as an opt-out
allowance. 121 Thus, the Committee abolished the spurious class ac-
tion with its opt-in requirement. The Committee Notes accompa-
nying the 1966 revision stated that "the present provisions of 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) are not intended to be affected by Rule 23, as
amended." 1 22 The Advisory Committee apparently believed that it
had no authority to change the definition of the FLSA's class proce-
dures under the guise of a Federal Rules revision.1 23
It is likely that Congress passed the 1966 revision without being
aware either of the changes to Rule 23 (recommended by the
Supreme Court), or that the changes were not to be included in the
FLSA. Therefore, the FLSA class action has accidentally been fro-
zen in its pre-1966 spurious class action form. By unwittingly in-
corporating the FLSA enforcement standards into the ADEA in
1967, Congress equally restricted the ADEA class action. Conse-
quently, private enforcement actions have not been viable for either
FLSA or ADEA enforcement.124 Because there is nothing in either
the legislative history or the statutory evolution of the class action
to suggest Congress' desire to require an opt-in element, courts
should act cautiously when reviewing this prerequisite.125 As a final
note, post-judgment intervention procedures are allowed in jurisdic-
tions with liberal collateral estoppel rules.126 Since employees, who
fail to opt into the given suit, can either opt in after judgment, or
gain favorable judgment on their own claim through offensive col-
lateral estoppel, nothing is really saved by the opt-in rule.
Thus, extension of the Rule 23 class action to victims of employ-
ment-related age discrimination will not contravene congressional
intent. A statutory accident does not justify withholding access to
120. Spahn, supra note 89, at 130.
121. Id.
122. MOORE, supra note 104, at % 23.10[5].
123. See Spahn, supra note 89, at 131.
124. Id. at 124-32.
125. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). Although the Court noted that ADEA fol-
lows the procedural framework of the FLSA, it never actually addressed the opt-in question.
Instead, it considered whether juries were allowed in ADEA suits. Noting that ADEA
§ 626(b) allows a court to grant "legal or equitable relief," and § 626(c) authorizes individu-
als to bring actions for "legal or equitable relief," while the seventh amendment provides a
right to a jury trial in all cases in which legal relief is available, the Court determined that a
jury trial should be permitted in ADEA actions. The implication of the jury right certainly
conforms with the liberal, remedial goals of the ADEA. Thus, the Lorillard rationale easily
could be extended to the opt-in question, and the lower courts may have overreacted to the
Lorillard holding.
126. National Classes, supra note 69, at 1513.
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this mechanism allowed by Title VII to ameliorate race and gender
inequities. Legislative mistakes are not irreparable, and the effects
of rampant age discrimination demand the removal of the opt-in
requirement from the ADEA.
3. Judicial Interpretation of FLSA Section 216
Section 216 of the FLSA requires potential party plaintiffs af-
firmatively to opt into the class. Courts have had difficulty harmo-
nizing the stark language of section 216 with the professed purpose
of the ADEA (which incorporates section 216 of the FLSA). While
struggling with early interpretations, the courts were tempted to use
Title VII's Rule 23 as a model. Thus, in Blankenship v. Ralston
Purina Co., 27 for example, the district court reasoned that since the
ADEA's substantive procedures are almost identical to those of Ti-
tle VII, the procedural devices used in Title VII actions also should
be available in ADEA litigation.'28 If Rule 23 class actions are lib-
erally allowed in Title VII discrimination suits, reasoned the Blank-
enship court, they should also be available for ADEA suits, because
a strict interpretation of section 216(b) would unduly restrict
ADEA enforcement, thereby contravening Congressional intent.' 29
In stating that Rule 23 was to be applied and that absent class mem-
bers would be bound by the court's decision, the Blankenship court
set forth three limitations for ADEA class actions:
(1) The class action must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and (b)(2);
(2) The issues raised by the "party plaintiff" or the class action
[would be] those issues that he [had] standing to raise ... and
that he [had] raised in the charge filed with the Secretary of La-
bor...; and
(3) Class members need notfile consents to sue under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) provided that their grievances [fell] within the charges
filed by the party plaintiff.13 °
127. 62 F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
128. The Court based its decision on the congressional intent underlying the ADEA:
Since Congress clearly defined its policy as remedial with respect to such social
problems, the courts have generally looked to the Congressional intent behind the
law rather than to procedural restrictions which might impair the law's effectiveness
.... The federal courts in particular have recognized that the Rule 23 class action is
particularly adaptable to situations involving discrimination.
Id. at 38.
129. Id. at 39. Opt-in requirements have been frowned upon under federal class action
rules and were abolished by the 1966 amendments. National Classes, supra note 69, at 1499.
Most state rules do not expressly provide for opting in. Id.
130. Blankenship, 62 F.R.D. at 41 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See Procedural
Aspects, supra note 50, at 927.
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The third guideline demonstrates that "[w]hile implicitly recogniz-
ing Rule 23 and section 216(b) as mutually exclusive, the court
failed to confront Congress' explicit preference for FLSA [opt-in]
enforcement procedures."' 131
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Blankenship approach in
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 132 LaChapelle held that Rule 23
could not be used to circumvent the unambiguous opt-in require-
ment of section 216(b). 133 Although some isolated cases continue to
apply Rule 23 class actions to ADEA complaints, 134 the Supreme
Court, in Lorillard v. Pons,135 laid to rest any argument that similar-
ities between Title VII and the ADEA imply the Congressional de-
sire that the two statutes be enforced by similar procedures.1 36 The
Court reasoned that significant differences in the remedial and pro-
cedural provisions,"' as well as Congress' failure to adopt Title VII
enforcement procedures while using its substantive prohibitions 1
38
require this result. Accepting the premise that Congress was aware
of Rule 23 at the time it enacted the ADEA, one should also accept
that Congress meant to include FLSA procedures; otherwise Con-
gress would have expressly included Rule 23 in the ADEA. This
argument has been adopted by every circuit today.139
131. Lipschultz, supra note 92, at 1384. See Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc., 5 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 7995 (D.D.C. 1972) (allowing ADEA actions to be brought as a class
action under Rule 23).
132. 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
133. "There is a fundamental, irreconcilable difference between the class action described
by Rule 23 and that provided for by [FLSA § 216(b)]." LaChapelle, 513 F.2d at 288.
134. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiffs
allowed to send notice to potential plaintiffs under FLSA § 216(b) "in an appropriate case.");
Sussman v. Vornado, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 680 (D.N.J. 1981) (employee discharged shortly after
strike because of age).
135. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
136. Id. at 585.
137. Id. at 584-85.
138. Id. See Lipschultz, supra note 129, at 1386.
139. See Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ac-
tion "to compel employment of plaintiff"); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J.
1983) (action for injunctive and monetary relief for discharge based on age-based corporate
policy); EEOC v. Gilbarco Inc., 615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980) (action commenced when com-
plaint filed irrespective of whether individual plaintiffs are named); LaChapelle v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (only opt in type classes permissible in ADEA
suits); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'dpercuriam, 453
F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (action for minimum wages
under FLSA cannot be brought as class action); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (voluntary and involuntary retirement of workers based on age); Locascio
v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (action against company lay-offs based on
age); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (action for
minimum wages under FLSA cannot be maintained as class action); Partlow v. Jewish Or-
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III. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE ADEA
A. The Notice Problem
To further complicate the problems caused by the opt-in re-
quirement, the ADEA provides no notification to potential class
employees of the class' existence. This statutory silence augments
the general employee ignorance of age discrimination laws. 14° A
1981 Harris survey found that: (1) the more educated the person,
the more likely he is to know about the ADEA; and (2) men gener-
ally have greater awareness of the ADEA than do women. 141 If age
discrimination victims do not appreciate what employer conduct
will constitute ADEA violations, the chances are even greater that
the victims will be unaware of an ADEA class into which to opt.
Neither the FLSA nor the ADEA discuss whether plaintiffs
may notify interested parties of the existence of pending representa-
tive actions. Similarly, the legislative history does not indicate any
Congressional desire to prohibit notice. In fact, Congress "chose
not to ban informative, nonsolicitous communication" under the
Portal-to-Portal Act. 142
Numerous federal policies support the availability of notice in
ADEA actions. The first amendment protects certain associational
and speech rights of ADEA plaintiffs, counsel, and class members
necessary for effective group legal action.143 There also is a federal
phans' Home of S. Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981) (action for adequate overtime
compensation not barred for those plaintiffs not consenting to FELA class action); Dolan v.
Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984) (FLSA plaintiff must opt in to be
bound by judgment); Moysey v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1979) (federal disabled
employees over age 60, upon reemployment, had annuity deducted from regular pay, rehired
as temporary and terminable at will, brought suit to enjoin this deduction and for retroactive
relief). The First Circuit has not ruled on this question.
140. A Labor Department study of employees in New Jersey, California, and Maine, for
instance, found that 88% of male and 84% of female respondents did not, for whatever
reason, indicate knowledge of state age discrimination laws. Only 3% of the men and 9% of
the women knew of this statute and its upper age limit of 70. Fewer employees were unaware
of the ADEA, the respective figures being 71% of the men and 82% of the women. Only
15% and 9%, respectively, were fully familiar with the federal statute, and this was a mere
three years after the highly publicized 1978 amendments were enacted. INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 62, at 120-21.
141. INFORMATION PAPER, supra note 70, at 53.
142. See 93 CONG. REc. 2093 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell) (condoning dissemina-
tion of information about decisions affecting rights, but not those intended to stir up "cham-
perty" and improper court practice); Class Notice, supra note 13, at 29.
143. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (trial court ban
on most communications from litigants and counsel to current or potential class members in
race discrimination action held to have unconstitutionally restricted expression), aff'd, 452
U.S. 89, 104 (1981) (trial court order created "serious restraints on expression").
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interest in avoiding a multiplicity of ADEA suits; notice will allow
many individual suits to be collapsed into a few class actions. Be-
cause potential plaintiffs have time to reflect before opting in if no-
tice, as is typically done, is posted in the workplace or mailed to
class members, the federal policy against improper solicitation and
stimulation of litigation is upheld. Judges can inspect these written
notices for improprieties, and the attorneys will usually have no pe-
cuniary motive to solicit business, since they are often legal aid or
public interest lawyers. 1" Finally, notice will provide fairness and
due process to all employees with claims against the defendants.' 45
Unlike the question of Rule 23 incorporation into the ADEA,
the courts are divided on whether they should allow notice, and if
so, who can give it. The Ninth Circuit'46 allows notice when re-
quired by due process. However, because potential plaintiffs who
fail to opt into the class suffer no resjudicata effect, they cannot be
adversely affected. Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasons that unless due
process rights are threatened, notice need not be ordered.147 This
reasoning serves to prevent an employee discriminated against be-
cause of age from learning of or joining a class action.
Other courts, following the Second Circuit's lead in Braunstein
v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories,148 have expressly rejected this
due process analysis. Instead, they reason that even though due
process may not require notice, a district court has the power to
order notice in the proper case. 149 Such a holding serves both the
interest of avoiding multiple suits and the broad remedial purposes
of the ADEA. Defining a "proper case," however, is not so easy.
Some courts rely on a "fundamental fairness" test in which the crit-
ical inquiry is whether, absent notice, the potential plaintiffs possess
144. See Class Notice, supra note 13, at 31-35.
145. Benefits to the employer from notice include avoiding multiple litigation and greater
efficiency. Lipschultz, supra note 92, at 1394-95. See National Classes, supra note 69, at
1506-07 n.91.
146. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977).
147. See also McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984); Dolan v.
Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984); Georke v. Commercial Contractors &
Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Soler v. G&U, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Baker v. Mitchie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494 (W.D. Va. 1982). See also Lipschultz,
supra note 92, at 1394-95.
148. 600 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
149. See also Behr v. Drake Hotel, 586 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (all potential plain-
tiffs entitled to notice although some may be subsequently dismissed from the class); Woods
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 531
F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J. 1981).
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meaningful access to the courts.'5 0 A second standard is to allow
notice when the Rule 23(a) requirements have been met.' 5 One
should observe, nevertheless, that notice is discretionary under Rule
23(d)(2). The judge can grant notice at any stage of the certification
process, including precertification, regardless of due process consid-
erations. Moreover, the judge has two other sources of power under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 42(a) recognizes the
court's power to make such orders as may "tend to avoid unneces-
sary costs or delay in a pending action."' 5 2 This broad authority
would certainly include providing notice to potential plaintiffs con-
cerning pending litigation under section 216(b). Similarly, Rule 83
allows federal district courts to make or amend rules as long as the
new or amended rules do not conflict with existing federal rules or
statutes. Since section 216(b) does not prohibit the court from
granting notice, the judge should be able to do so under Rule 83.1
Even if a court should allow notice to be given to potential class
plaintiffs, it must still decide which parties may convey it. Braun-
stein held that the court, the plaintiff-representative, or his attorney
could send this communication. Other courts, however, allow only
the plaintiff or counsel to perform this function, not wishing to im-
ply court approval of the cause of action.'54 The Eighth Circuit
follows the most restrictive approach, allowing only the plaintiff to
send notice.' 55
If potential plaintiffs must opt into ADEA class actions, then it
is incumbent upon the court to allow notice of such a class to be
given to all potential class members; otherwise, aggrieved employees
will have a seriously diminished opportunity to litigate the alleged
age discrimination through a class action. Since public policy re-
quires the notice to reach all potential plaintiffs in the most efficient,
effective manner, the largest number of conduits should be permit-
ted. This means that the plaintiff, his counsel, and perhaps even
the court should be allowed to convey notice.' 6
150. See Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 112,919 (D. Md. 1979);
Riojas v. Seal Products, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
151. See Geller v. Markham, 19 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622 (D. Conn. 1979);
Lipschultz, supra note 92, at 1393. This method has not been widely embraced by the courts.
Id. at 1393-94.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
153. Lipschultz, supra note 92, at 1394-96; Spahn, supra note 89, at 140-44.
154. See, eg., Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984); Woods v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982).
155. See, eg., McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984).
156. There are a number of factors which a judge might consider in deciding whether
notice should be permitted, including: class members' awareness of their substantive rights,
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Of course, should Congress and the courts recognize, by over-
riding the opt-in requirement, that the current version of the
ADEA cannot adequately combat age discrimination, the notice
provision carefully crafted by the authors of Rule 23 will take care
of the lack of notice under the ADEA. In any case, the widespread
expansion of age discrimination demands availability of class-wide
notice.
B. Soliciting Potential Plaintiffs
A related question is whether the plaintiff and his attorney may
independently solicit potential plaintiffs under section 216(b). The
courts traditionally have been reluctant to permit solicitation, fear-
ing that an onerous number of frivolous cases will be submitted by
greedy plaintiffs and attorneys. Solicitation is considered unprofes-
sional, something that might be done by a backstreet panhandler.
Although some courts do in fact permit solicitation, 157 others
only allow judicially-authorized notice identifying the plaintiff's
counsel.158 Still other courts feel that a bar on solicitation is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. 159 One justification for banning so-
licitation is that unless due process requires it, a statute must specif-
ically authorize it for the court to allow independent notice. 160
The need for independent plaintiff/counsel solicitation arises
only if there is no court-authorized notice. Therefore, it is in the
court's interest to authorize notice, because it can directly control
its content and method of conveyance. If no notice is allowed for
an opt-in class action, the court should permit independent solicita-
tion. Congress indicated that it wanted class actions under the
ADEA to have an opt-in element, not insurmountable hurdles. As
the ADEA is currently codified, it is completely lacking in remedial
poverty which might otherwise preclude filing of an individual suit, size of the individual
damages claim, common issues of law and fact, and any pecuniary interest of counsel in a
positive outcome. Class Notice, supra note 13, at 37-41. This will aid the remedial goals of
the ADEA while preventing unwieldy classes.
157. Joyce v. Sandia Laboratories, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,043A (N.D. Cal.
1980) (although constrained by stare decisis, the court felt that allowing notice was accepta-
ble in some narrow circumstances).
158. See Riojas v. Seal Products, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
159. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980); Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d
186 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); Zerate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
160. Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. La. 1975). See also Partlow v. Jewish
Orphans' Home of S. Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981); Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23
(M.D.N.C. 1977).
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
A. The Need for Legislative Action
While Title VII prohibited job discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, and national origin, it made no mention of age
discrimination. Consequently, Congress directed the Labor Depart-
ment to research the extent of the problem.162 The Secretary's find-
ings were sobering, reporting widespread employer use of arbitrary
age cutoffs in hiring and termination decisions.' 63
Many of these age limits were reactions to stereotypes. As
noted by James P. Mitchell, discrimination developed from percep-
tions and attitudes based on prejudices "entirely out of step with
modem industrial reality."' 16 Newell Brown, Assistant Secretary
of Labor and Chairman of the Federal Council of Aging, similarly
stated that "[a]ge barriers were largely created by what men
think."' 1
6
Congress was generally shocked by the dimension of the prob-
lem. 166 The Labor Secretary concluded that "[t]he possibility of
161. See Lipschultz, supra note 92, at 1396-98.
162. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241 (1983).
163. Most establishments used upper age limits in the age 45-59 range. This was particu-
larly true of skilled industrial, service, clerical, and professional/semiprofessional jobs. How-
ever, 60% of the nonskilled industrial concerns with limits set them in the 35-49 year range
(21% for the ages 35-39). An alarming 13.5% of age limits for sales positions were for work-
ers under age 35. Very few companies reported limits in the age 60+ brackets, indicating
that any ceilings were set at even lower age levels. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER
AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: RESEARCH MATERIALS 9
(1965) [hereinafter RESEARCH MATERIALS].
Employers listed a number of reasons for these upper age restrictions and limited hirings.
Physical requirements and job requirements were mentioned 34.2% and 25.1% of the time,
respectively. Limited work life expectancy due to mandatory retirement drew 5.1% of the
responses. Other frequent reasons cited for failure to hire older workers included: internal
promotion, earnings, pension plan costs, and perceived lack of skills and experience. Signifi-
cantly, adaptability, training costs, and productivity were mentioned only 2 to 3% of the
time. Id. at 10.
164. W. GRAEBER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT: THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF
AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION 1885-1978, at 237 (1980).
165. Id.
166. Half of all private job openings were barred to applicants over 55, while a quarter
excluded those over 45. Seven hundred and fifty thousand workers 45 years of age or older-
most of them under 65-were unemployed, consuming $750 million in annual unemployment
insurance benefits. Over one-third of all men who had been unemployed for at least 27 weeks
were over 45, although this group comprised less than one-quarter of the entire work force.
Over one-half of the nation's poor families were headed by persons 45 or over, and more than
one-third were headed by persons 55 or over. 113 CONG. REC. 34,746 (1967) (statement of
Rep. Dent). Unemployed persons between the ages of 45 and 64 faced twice the average
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new nonstatutory means of dealing with such arbitrary discrimina-
tion has been explored. That area is barren .... A clear-cut and
implemented Federal policy ... would provide a foundation for a
much-needed vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hiring
without discrimination on the basis of age." '16 7 This finding was
largely supported by President Johnson's observation that:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired,
find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination.
Despite our present low rate of unemployment, there has been a
persistent average of 850,000 people age 45 and over who are
unemployed. Today more than three-quarters of the billion dol-
lars in unemployment insurance is paid each year to workers
who are 45 and over. They comprise 27 percent of all unem-
ployed, and 40 percent of the long-term unemployed. 168
As a means to attack age discrimination, Congress enacted the
ADEA. 169
B. What Is Age Discrimination?
1. Age Discrimination Defined
Age discrimination technically means any incident where two
groups of people are treated differently solely on the basis of age.
The term is conventionally used to illustrate situations where there
is no reasonable basis for particular age limitations. The use of age
as a proxy is prevalent in the United States Constitution itself' 7 °
number of "sick" days experienced by employed people in the same age bracket. SECRE-
TARY'S REPORT, supra note 62, at 11.
167. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
This recommendation was due, in part, to age discrimination policies being structural, not
merely stereotypical. In other words, once unemployed, older workers' lack of education
hurts them in the job market. Older persons generally do poorly on personal competency
exams because of rusty test-taking skills. Furthermore, internal promotion, seniority sys-
tems, corporate-wide age limits, and the adverse impact on state worker's compensation laws
by recent court decisions collectively operate to reduce older workers' chances of employ-
ment. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 62, at 12, 15.
168. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 167, at 2.
169. Id. at 1. Indeed, voting against the ADEA was considered to be unpatriotic. The
bill passed the House by a 344 to 13 vote. Congress may also have rushed to catch up with
the times. One Senator stated that twenty-four states and Puerto Rico already had statutes
prohibiting age discrimination in employment. 113 CONG. REc. 31,253 (1967) (statement of
Sen. Yarborough).
170. There are four instances in the main document: The President and Vice President
must be at least 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. (The twelfth amendment specifies that:
"[No] person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of
Vice President .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XII.). Senators must have reached the age of 30.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Age twenty-five is the minimum threshold required for repre-
sentatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Federal judges receive guarantees of life tenure,
obviously barring mandatory retirement, but this provision is aimed more to insulate the
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Nor is the Constitution the sole realm of governmental age line-
drawing. A 1954 analysis of the Illinois laws, for instance, showed
1,978 statutes which contained references to age.1 7 1
The use of an arbitrary age standard is not necessarily automati-
cally suspect. After careful debate, society has set minimum ages
for entering school, voting, drinking, and driving as measures of
maturity. But governmental age limits on employment and retire-
ment which pretend there is a magic age at which a person no
longer is competent to earn a livelihood deserve searching scrutiny
for, unlike the former, the worker can never outgrow these prohibi-
tions. Moreover, such use by government sets a poor example for
private industry.
The government, however, is not the sole entity imposing un-
warranted maximum age standards. Annual investigations by the
Department of Labor in the first three years after enactment of the
ADEA found many instances of age discrimination in the private
sector.1 72 Sadly enough, these numbers have only increased. When
judiciary from public pressure than it is due to a concern over age discrimination. U.S.
CONsr. art. III, § 1. Note, however, that Congress has limited chief judges of federal district
courts and federal courts of appeal to 70 years of age. 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 136(a) (1983)
(although they may of course continue their role as judges). For a long time, the American
Bar Association played an informal role in approving selections for the federal judiciary, but
only recently has it abandoned the practice of not recommending nominees who are above
age 64. Eglit, supra note 5, at 865 n.20 (1981).
Furthermore, the fourteenth amendment provides for a reduction in a state's congres-
sional representation should it abrogate the right of any 21-year-old male to vote, this being
the universally accepted age of majority. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This provision was
designed to keep Southern states from taking the franchise from black citizens. And of
course the twenty-sixth amendment bars both the federal and state governments from setting
a voting age higher than 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
171. Nearly 75% of those statutes referred to the period from birth to age 21, and most of
them were aimed at the protection of children, especially with respect to physical care and
education, prohibition of child labor, and responsibility for criminal offenses. Those laws
which referred to ages 16 to 21 were primarily enabling in nature. Few laws addressed those
in the age 22 to 55 category. The 20% concerning individuals above age 50 dealt most often
with pensions, age retirement in various professions, and the protection of frail older persons.
L. Evans, Legal Definition of Age as Contained in Illinois Statute Law (Aug. 1954) (unpub-
lished master's degree thesis in University of Chicago Library). See also Neugarten, Age
Distinctions and Their Social Functions, 57 CHI.[-JKENT L. REV. 809, 821 (1981). A study
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights of ten federal agencies and programs con-
cluded that the use of age discrimination was widespread. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra
note 62, at 79-81.
172. In the first six months after the ADEA became effective, the Department of Labor
survey of 10,213 establishments for compliance found 120 separate ADEA infractions. An-
other survey conducted in 1971 revealed that the number of violations had reached 2,000.
The Labor Department additionally learned that substantial quantities of money were owed
to employees. Finally, the Department informally notified 14,000 employers, advertisers, em-
ployment agencies, and other organizations that their employment practices tended to pro-
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the national economy lapsed in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the
number of age discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC rose
to nearly 9,500 in 1981, a seventy-five percent increase over 1979's
total. 173 Moreover, state equal employment agencies received an-
other 8,400 charges, and $12.3 million in benefits were disbursed.
By 1981, the amount remitted had increased to approximately $28
million. 17 4 At the same time, the number of EEOC initiated suits
increased from 25 in 1979 to 89 in 1981175 to 96 in 1985.176
Even these large numbers do not tell the entire story because the
number of charges filed is not:
always the best indicator of the existence of widespread age dis-
crimination. Many charges are against small employers where
the personal nature of the employee-employer relationship makes
it easier for individuals to ascertain the cause of any action taken
against them, i.e. to conclude that age was a factor. Charges are
also generated by large lay-off situations where the impact may
be clear to the individual employee. 17
7
Between these two extremes, far fewer charges are filed. 178 Further-
more, these statistics do not convey the reality that certain employ-
ment practices constitute age discrimination, although the law does
not recognize them because the employee is not between the ages of
40 and 65.179
Age discrimination may be blatant, or more recently, fairly sub-
tle. For example, one 49-year-old woman was a secretary to a vice
president of a company. When he was laid off, she suddenly found
herself transferred to a new job two grades below her former one,
mote discrimination and, therefore, ought to be changed. WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC
CONTRACTS DIVISIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967, A REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATUTE
DURING 1968, at 6 (1969), 1970, at 3 (1971). See Over Sixty-Five, supra note 51, at 338.
173. The Unemployment Crisis Facing Older Americans: Hearings Before the House Se-
lect Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1982) (report by Chairman Claude Pepper)
[hereinafter Pepper]; Kogan, Age Discrimination, 1982 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 795, 796 at n.1 1.
174. INFORMATION PAPER, supra note 70, at 82, app. III.
175. Id. at 49. An informal survey of cases filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado from January 1982 through October 1984 also determined that the
number of filed ADEA suits had continued to increase. Twenty lawsuits which included an
ADEA claim were filed in 1982, and in the first nine months of 1984, thirty-nine such suits
were filed. Nosier & Wing, supra note 59, at 470 n.10. There is no reason to suspect that
Colorado has an abnormally large incidence of age discrimination.
176. Telephone interview with Nancy Fried, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor
(Jan. 9, 1986). In all fairness, this rise may have been due in part to management laying off
higher paid workers to trim costs. Pepper, supra note 173, at 64.
177. EEOC Enforcement, supra note 80, at 66.
178. Id.
179. Note, Over Sixty-Five, supra note 51, at 340.
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and was threatened with termination unless she accepted her new
responsibilities. At the same time, a much younger woman at the
company was allowed to refuse multiple secretarial jobs before ac-
cepting another promotion.180
In another example, a 63-year-old man had been a sales man-
ager for an automobile agency. He was suddenly and apparently
without reason demoted. The only explanation offered by the
owner was that it was "time for a younger generation to take over,"
notwithstanding the man's outstanding performance record. 181
And finally, an individual who investigated white collar crimes
and fraud for a county sheriff's department without making the ac-
tual arrests, was forced to retire at 61 despite the department's
mandatory retirement age of 65. He was simultaneously rehired by
the same department in a more dangerous job paying less money
with no benefits.182
While employers are subtle about what they tell job applicants,
age clearly is a factor affecting the decisions made by public and
private employers. For instance, the Denver Comprehensive Edu-
cation and Training (CETA) program found placement of retired
military persons difficult because "they are not the 25-year-old or
the 22-year-old." '183 The executive director of the Urban League of
Colorado noted that when employees responded to questions con-
cerning referred applicants, it was clear that many were covertly
judged on the basis of specific age distinctions. 84 Similarly, an an-
nual report about the CETA program for the State of Washington
observed that even if persons age 45 or older generally have "more
experience and training, many [of these] older workers have diffi-
culty finding employment because of employer resistance to hiring
persons over 45."I85 Interestingly enough, the perception that em-
ployment decisions are discriminatory is pervasive among
employers.18
6
A review of ADEA charges readily portrays the character of the
180. EEOC Enforcement, supra note 80, at 9 (statement of Anne Briggs).
181. Id. at 14 (statement of C. Fletcher Taylor).
182. Id. at 17-18 (statement of LeRoy Stanley Knight).
183. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 62, at 61 (statement of Lawrence Borom).
184. Id.
185. The study noted that employer resistance was rooted, in part, in mandatory retire-
ment policies. Id. It would seem that employers would rather invest in younger workers
having a longer time to provide returns. The Commission further noted that employers are
reluctant to commit or refer older employees into CETA programs because of the fear that
these "individuals [could not] be absorbed later into the regular workforce." Id. at 65.
186. Pepper, supra note 173, at 64.
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victims suffering from age discrimination. Termination of employ-
ment is by far the most frequent basis for charges of age discrimina-
tion. 18 7  It appears that manufacturers have received the most
complaints (approximately twenty-nine percent).1 88 During the pe-
riod 1980-1981, however, the services sector showed the largest in-
crease in the number of EEOC complaints (thirty-nine percent).1 8 9
Men lodge more complaints than women, especially in the older age
brackets.1 90 Of the aggregate number of age discrimination claims,
most come from individuals in the 50-59 age range (forty-seven per-
cent of all charges). 191 This is alarming because most people would
not consider themselves "over the hill" while in their fifties, espe-
cially since the federal government defines "retirement" as age 65
for Social Security eligibility.
Private employers are not, however, the sole practitioners of dis-
criminatory actions. Of 108 lawsuits reviewed for an EEOC report,
forty-three percent were against public employers, while three were
against unions. 192 Age discrimination has even affected the medical
profession. 193
Thus, the evidence shows widespread age discrimination both in
the private and public sectors. 194 Men and women in their peak
187. Sixty percent of all allegations claimed illegal job termination. Contentions of dis-
criminatory hiring was next with 16% of all charges, and other major complaints included
unfair terms and conditions (11%), promotion (9%), demotion (6%), and wages and benefits
(5% each) policies. INFORMATION PAPER, supra note 70, at 91, app. X.
188. Other industries incurring many discrimination charges as of 1980 include both the
services (20%) and public administration (14%) areas. Interestingly enough, agriculture,
mining, and construction-all very physical jobs- suffered only negligible charges. Id. at
113, app. XV-D.
189. Id. Other marked increases for this period included trade-retail (26.5%), finance
(23.2%), and transportation (20%). Major culprits like manufacturing and public adminis-
tration showed only 19% and 1% increases, respectively, indicating that shear size may be
the most important cause of many grievances. Id. at 114, app. XV-E.
190. Id. at 112, app. XV-C. The largest number of complaints come from men in the 60-
64 age bracket, with the number of complaints diminishing after age 64. This is particularly
true of hiring, benefits, and demotion charges, where approximately 62 to 68% of all charges
are filed by men. But wages, promotion, and terms and condition discrimination seem to
affect males and females equally. Id. at 111, app. XV-B.
191. Id. at 110, app. XV-A.
192. Id. at 51, app. XIII.
193. The Civil Rights Commission investigated selection standards of 114 medical
schools, finding that 28 schools had specified age limitations. One of these 28 institutions
went so far as to comment in its informal bulletin that "applicants over the age of 30 rarely
will be considered. No applications from persons over 35 will be accepted." CIVIL RIGHTs
COMM'N, supra note 62, at 76.
194. Professor Schuck forcefully argues for the use of age-based classifications to select
individuals to receive aid from federally-assisted programs. He notes that age is an objective,
readily measurable criterion to meet federal program requirements, posing a defense against
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working years are confronted by a host of discriminatory actions in
almost every job field. Such omnipresent discrimination cannot be
ignored; the problem must be faced directly. Indeed, finding em-
ployment for the elderly will become a greater necessity given that
elderly citizens will constitute a larger segment of society.195
2. Underlying Rationales
What engenders the practice of age discrimination? The most
obvious reasons are time and cost savings. Rather than engaging in
time-consuming and costly determinations of individual capabili-
ties, a personnel director or program administrator can rely on a
clear, superficially justifiable standard: employee age. This tool has
the advantage of treating all people of similar age equally. This tool
also allows employers to reduce labor costs by employing younger,
less expensive (perhaps nonunion) workers. In this light, age dis-
crimination is the ultimate democratization of the work place.
Decisions resulting from public program directors' use of the
time and cost saving rationales are more troublesome. A study by
bureaucratic bias, error, and citizen manipulation. Furthermore, because everyone shares a
particular age characteristic at some point, other groups will be less likely to oppress persons
of an older age group, because they will be in an analogous position in the future. Moreover,
legislators presumably will make less arbitrary use of age standards than of race or sex classi-
fications, which regularly undergo exacting review by courts. Finally, no systematic political
disability or historical disadvantage supports the conclusion that age criteria are suspect.
Professor Schuck finally contends that the use of an immutable characteristic like age to
allocate benefits may cause less stigmatization or damage then the use of individual character-
istics reflecting merit. See Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
This analysis fits into a federal framework in which federal legislators must allocate lim-
ited funds, and where decisions about who receives the benefits are made in a political vortex.
Such reasoning should be inapplicable in the public and private employment sectors, because
it serves to deprive persons of the means to earn a living without considering whether the
individual is, in fact, qualified for the employment. The same propositions could be advanced
supporting race or sex classifications. The simple assertion that standardized age classifica-
tions are more egalitarian and less injurious or that persons receive the same benefits irrespec-
tive of capability at an earlier point in their life, or that it increases administrative ease is an
inadequate justification.
The fact is that age discrimination has been, and will continue to be pervasive, refuting
the argument that senior citizens have not been historically disadvantaged like other pro-
tected minorities. Furthermore, the problem is destined to grow worse as a greater segment
of society is represented by the elderly. At any point in time, a discrete, readily ascertainable
group of older Americans are being deprived of employment simply because they are over a
maximum age standard. Like color, sex, or national origin, one cannot change his age; conse-
quently, age discrimination should not be considered less invidious than other forms of invidi-
ous characterization.
195. Persons between the ages of 20 and 34 currently constitute 45% of the entire em-
ployee population; that percentage is expected to decrease to 35% by the year 2000. SHADES
OF GRAY, supra note 62, at 155-56.
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the Civil Rights Commission of CETA programs discovered that
some programs were concerned about the cost effectiveness of train-
ing persons over 45 when the training expense was compared with
the payback received.' 96 This essentially amounts to a return on
investment analysis. As taxpayers, however, we expect public reme-
dial programs to increase society's benefit, not only to benefit the
administrative agency.
Rigid age guidelines have several disadvantages negating any
potential benefits. First, the use of age alone discounts individual
differences, ignoring individual strengths. Age also limits the op-
portunities and privileges of a person, thus preventing him from de-
veloping to his full potential. Society is thereby deprived of the
elderly's complete participation. As society ages and resources
dwindle, the participation and wisdom of older citizens will become
even more valuable.197 To summarize, the use of age as a sole em-
ployment criterion facilitates stereotyping, ignores merit, and un-
dermines basic societal concepts of equality and individual worth.
Because age is an immutable characteristic affecting only a discrete,
readily ascertainable group of individuals at any given time, em-
ployment discrimination based on age becomes untenable. 9
C. Tangible Effects of Age Discrimination
Unemployment for older workers is increasing at a faster rate
than for any other age group.199 Ironically, union-supported senior-
196. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 62, at 166. Some administrators contended:
"The cost, the benefit to society, or the probability of success of serving persons of different
ages ... differs, and therefore resources should be focused on those age groups that will
provide society with the greatest return on its investment." Id. at 79-81.
197. Birren & Loucks, Age Related Change and the Individual, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV.
833, 834-35 (1981).
198. See Eglit, supra note 5, at 860-62.
199. Pepper, supra note 173, at 60. In the first nine months of 1982, it jumped 24% for
those 55 and older, compared to 11% for those 16-24. The unemployment increase for all
others was 16%. Id. There were 771,000 unemployed people 55 and over, and 1.7 million
jobless who were 45 and older, representing the highest unemployment since World War II.
Not only are older workers temporarily unemployed, but also age discrimination largely un-
dermines their efforts to find new employment. The House committee report indicates that
roughly 67% of men 55 to 64 years old were employed, representing a 23% decrease since
1950. Id. at 61. Generally, employees between 55 and 64 remain unemployed approximately
20 weeks compared to 15.5 weeks for all unemployed persons. Id. at 60. The net result is
that relative to all adults over 25, workers 60 years or older are thrice as likely to discontinue
searching for replacement employment. Id. Even if this older worker is able to find a new
position, studies indicate that he will lose an average annual amount of $50 from his
paycheck. Id. Thus, a worker returning to the work force at age 45 would lose an average
$1,000 in salary (compared to a returning worker age 25). The finding having the greatest
economic significance is that age discrimination cost this country $1.5 billion in unemploy-
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ity systems greatly contribute to this problem. When a business is
in trouble, the youngest employees are laid off first. When the busi-
ness finally closes, the older workers find that the younger workers
have already taken all the comparable positions in the community,
resulting, generally, in permanent unemployment for the older
worker.2°°
Contrary to popular belief, older workers do not anxiously await
their golden retirement years.201 Companies induce workers to re-
tire early by offering lucrative early retirement options. Once out of
the labor force, however, many early retirees discover they cannot
afford to live off their pensions. By then it is too late to find new
employment.2 °2
The effects of unemployment are more severe on older workers
than on other age groups because they typically have been with one
company longer. Usually they have higher wages, stronger loyal-
ties, and more friends. Consequently, they have more to lose by
being laid off than their younger colleagues.
Although workers in their 50's often have children in college,
and mortgage and car payments to make, they cannot begin to draw
a pension since they have not met the age and service requirements
necessary to have their pension rights vest. Furthermore, they are
not eligible for Social Security early retirement until age 62, and not
qualified for Medicare until age 65.203 Older workers may find
themselves in a precarious financial position, sometimes resulting in
poverty. 204
ment insurance benefit payments in 1982. Id Even with lower inflation rates since 1982, the
amount of unemployment benefits paid because of age discrimination is still substantial. Id.
at 60-61. See Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 90, at 1063.
200. Pepper, supra note 173, at 65.
201. A study of those electing to take reduced social security benefits for retiring before
age 65 showed that only 28% retired for voluntary reasons, such as being needed in the
home, or job dissatisfaction. Over Sixty-Five, supra note 51, at 335. The others retired be-
cause they were in poor health, had reached the compulsory retirement age, or were being
laid off. Id. See Lauriat & Rabin, Men Who Claim Benefits Before Age 65: Findings from A
Survey of New Beneficiaries, 1968, 33 Soc. SECURITY BULL. (1970).
202. Pepper, supra note 173, at 65. Furthermore, retirement programs sometimes are not
entirely voluntary, because employers have been known to coerce workers into retiring early,
particularly when the economy turns sluggish. Id A good example is Chrysler Corporation,
which was required to reinstate eight of its workers after forcing early retirement or layoff.
Id
203. Id. at 63.
204. A 1969 Senate Special Committee on the Aging report found that "three out of
every ten persons in the over sixty-five group-in contrast to one in nine younger people-
[were] living below the poverty level." Over Sixty-Five, supra note 51, at 333 (citing 115
CONG. REc. 230 (1964)). Average pensions, for example, only amount to 20-40% of average
pre-retirement earnings. Over Sixty-Five, supra note 51, at 335.
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Because older persons tend to suffer from longer periods of un-
employment, they are more likely to experience higher blood pres-
sure, cholesterol levels, average pulse rate, and are more prone to
develop stress-related diseases such as diabetes, peptic ulcers, gout,
hypertension and arthritis.2 °5 Long periods of unemployment also
increase the likelihood of "depression, low self-esteem, anxiety and
tension, insomnia, anger and irritation, resentment, and suspi-
cion."' 6 Depleted financial resources also might contribute to the
development of mental illness.2°7
People from all types of backgrounds suffer from age discrimi-
nation. Dr. John R. Coleman, who, in 1973, was the president of
Haverford College, had this to say about his dismissal from experi-
mental menial summer employment at age 51:
I'd never been fired and I'd never been unemployed. For three
days I walked the streets. Though I had a bank account, though
my children's tuition was paid, though I had a salary and a job
waiting for me back in Haverford, I was demoralized. I had an
inkling of how professionals my age feel when they lose their job
and their confidence begins to sink. 08
Age discrimination continues to affect older employees even af-
ter they have become unemployed. Although the Age Discrimina-
tion Act of 1975209 guarantees that federal programs will be free
from arbitrary age considerations, age discrimination in the private
sector can limit the very availability of these programs. CETA
training and public employment programs, as well as Vocational
Rehabilitation assistance plans, restrict participation of older per-
sons because referrals to these services depend upon cooperation
from public and private employment markets which discriminate on
the basis of age.2" 0 A Civil Rights Commission report concluded
that age discrimination in federally supported programs can only be
205. Pepper, supra note 173, at 64.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Agatstein, supra note 62, at 309 (quoting John R. Coleman, President, Haverford
College).
209. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, § 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1983)). "[N]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id
§ 6102.
210. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 62, at 61. Although people in the 22-44 age
bracket suffered 46.5 % of the unemployment in 1976, they only accounted for approximately
36% of CETA enrollees. Likewise, although the 45-54 and 55-65 age brackets account for
10.9% and 6.8% of unemployment, respectively, roughly 4% and 2% of persons respectively
aged 45-54 and 55-64 enrolled in CETA Title I programs receive help. By contrast, 17.1% of
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eliminated if it is concurrently eliminated from the entire job
market. 211
D. Judicial Treatment: An Equal Protection Argument
Applying an equal protection analysis to private employers
demonstrates how the Court has erred in its characterization of age.
If either a fundamental right is at stake or the litigant is a member
of a "suspect class," the Court will protect an individual who is
denied the benefits or rights given to others similarly situated. Un-
fortunately, the judiciary has always declined to find a fundamental
right to earn a living,2 12 and the Supreme Court placed a roadblock
in the latter path by deciding in Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia that age is not a suspect class.2 13 Murgia involved a state
law requiring the retirement of uniformed state police officers at age
50.214 Deferring to the legislature's age distinctions, the Court dis-
tinguished age and race classifications in three ways. First, unlike
blacks, older persons have not been subjected to a "history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment."2 ' Second, the elderly have not been
discriminated against by "stereotyped characteristics not truly in-
dicative of their abilities. ' 2 16 Finally, older people do not constitute
a "discrete and insular minority deserving of extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process," since age is a process
which affects everyone in society.217
Unfortunately, our society eases its conscience by using the sus-
pect class analysis to justify the general belief that older workers are
not victims of age discrimination-or at least affected less than
those fighting other forms of discrimination. At best, such a socie-
tal view manifests reckless ambivalence; at worst, it may reflect an
the unemployment population is younger than 19, but this group accounts for 36% of CETA
enrollees. Id. at 31.
Vocational Rehabilitation ("VR") programs are no different. Workers age 55-59 account
for 16.4% and 19.2% of the disabled and severely disabled population respectively, but con-
stitute only 6.2% of all rehabilitation clients. Although only 6.7% and 3.5% of the disabled
and severely disabled groups are between the ages of 20 and 24, they comprise 22.7% of the
VR's openings. Id. at 18.
211. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 62, at 66-67.
212. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1873). Besides most of the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, courts also view privacy, voting in state elections, freedom
of travel, and an ill-defined notion of freedom from indigence-related disparities in the crimi-
nal justice system as fundamental. Eglit, supra note 5, at 874-75.
213. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
214. Id. at 308.
215. lo at 313.
216. Iad
217. Id. See Harvard Note, supra note 55, at 386.
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insidious motive. Older people might seem to be better off com-
pared to victims of race discrimination, who have suffered through
this country's long-standing history of unequal treatment. This
misperception may be attributable to the fact that age is a less obvi-
ous trait than skin color or ethnicity. Older people, in fact, suffer
and probably will continue to suffer from age discrimination. The
disproportionate impact evidences the removal of, and, in many
cases, the conscious seizure of, the human need to be both in-
dependent and self-reliant. Because the Supreme Court has vigor-
ously championed the plight of blacks and, more recently,
women,"' it is somewhat inconsistent for the Court to ignore the
equally injurious effects of age discrimination.
Television, newspapers, and other shapers of public opinion re-
grettably foster erroneous images of old age. "Media coverage of
the elderly poor, the elderly sick, the elderly institutionalized, and
the elderly unemployed or retired may be protecting and reinforcing
the distorted stereotypes of the elderly." '219 Notes another
commentator:
The few exceptional characters in family dramas, detective sto-
ries, and situation comedies notwithstanding, most aged men and
women are represented as one-dimensional, peripheral types who
lack (or are denied) the full range of human feelings and foibles
expressed by younger actors. Americans over sixty are dispro-
portionately found in commercials recommending health aids or
geared to nostalgia buffs, but they almost never sell cars or
clothing.220
In short, "older people are perceived as set in their ways, conserva-
tive, disliking change, physically and mentally inactive (if not inca-
pacitated), and generally without much to offer those around
them."22' The unfortunate reality is that old age is unjustifiably
linked to inability, causing 9,000 annual complaints to the EEOC
alone. Older workers can become more productive with age. Ad-
mittedly, at some point age is related to ability. However, older
workers' capacity for physical and intellectual rigor is sufficiently
218. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Court found invidious discrimination
in Social Security Act survivors' benefits, which paid widow regardless of dependency, but
paid widower only if he was receiving over half of his support from deceased wife); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting sale of liquor to females under 18
and males under 21 was gender-based). See Levine, Comments on the Constitutional Law of
Age Discrimination, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1081, 1108 (1981).
219. OLD AGE, supra note 62, at 163 (citing the findings of a 1975 Louis Harris & Associ-
ates survey).
220. Id.
221. Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 90, at 1062.
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unrelated to chronological age as to make the use of arbitrary age
standards unjust. Scholars emphasize the greater variability that
exists among the aged, resulting in greater awareness of the "extent
and virulence of ageism in comtemporary America." '
When asked to consider the issue, employers find that their
older employees are more than competent. 223  Psychological re-
search indicates that people age at different rates in different man-
ners,z z4 causing divergent effects on "competency. 2 2 ' There are
several crucial aspects of physical performance: strength, endur-
ance, speed, agility and flexibility. 26 Scientists have also found that
the average physical performance of healthy, older adults tends to
approach that of younger adults.22 7 Only speed of performance
seems to be age-related; in contrast, endurance, agility, flexibility
222. SHADES OF GRAY, supra note 62, at 121 (emphasis in original). According to Dr.
Butler, the first director of the National Institute on Aging, not only do gender and color
form the basis of systematic discriminatory stereotypes for women and blacks, respectively,
but also "[a]geism [serves] as a systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against [older]
persons." Id.
223. An employer-answered survey rated their older workers equal to or better than
younger persons in nine out of ten characteristics influencing job performance. Among the
nine were: quantity of work, quality of work, accident rate, versatility, compatibility, and
speed in gaining proficiency. Adaptability to change was the only characteristic in which
older employees were rated inferior to younger workers. ACrION FOR OLDER AMERICANS,
1964 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON AGING 28 (1965).
224. There are three different definitions of age: (1) biological age, or the person's present
position with respect to his potential lifespan; (2) psychological age, which measures the ca-
pacity for adaptation to environmental change; and (3) social age, which indicates whether
the individual behaves younger or older than the expected behavior of a person of his chrono-
logical age. Birren & Loucks, supra note 197, at 839-40.
Similarly, there are three separate processes of change over time. One is the probability
that dying increases with age, called "senescing." Id. at 840. The second is "geronting,"
which constitutes changes in the worker's ability to adapt to environmental demands. Id
"Eldering," the third process, consists of progressive changes in roles and social habits. Id.
If the biological, psychological, and social processes of aging were completely interdependent,
then a sick, elderly person who is wise would never exist. Some individuals might age in an
accelerated manner biologically, but are spared intellectually. Id. On the other hand, there
are also people who have little intellectual awareness of their environment, but whose bodies
are in excellent shape. Since no single factor seems to govern the rate of human aging, diver-
sified patterns of aging are created. Id. at 840-41.
225. "Competency" refers to the ability to adapt to environmental demands, which re-
quires a vital brain well-supplied with blood flow and nutrients. Id. at 841. The central
nervous system which regulates the vital processes of the body and processes information to
handle symbols and reasoning is also important because the electrical activity of the brain
tends to slow as one ages. Id at 841-42. However, this phenomenon is more significantly
caused by disease rather than by age. Id. Consequently, senility only afflicts some people of
advanced age. Id.
226. Birren & Loucks, supra note 197, at 842.
227. Id. at 843.
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228and strength of older workers tend to improve with age.
Intelligence also appears to be unrelated to age. Recent investi-
gations, for example, have shown that many aspects of verbal intel-
ligence, including vocabulary size and verbal comprehension, show
no gradual diminution after age 65, and may possibly increase.229
Although older people take longer to discern relevant information
and seem to process information in smaller units,230 they tend to
compensate by organizing material conceptually, freeing themselves
to process fewer bits in classifying events, retrieving information,
and responding appropriately.231 This is where experience is advan-
tageous, for the older worker has seen many similar problems in the
past, and can remember the solution process. Older workers also
use experience to compensate for their physical limitations, chang-
ing their approach to the given task. Similarly, elderly people tend
to have very stable personalities. They manage their emotional re-
actions to crises better than their younger counterparts, establishing
an objective approach to solving problems.232
If physical and intellectual abilities are not substantially age-de-
pendent, then it would be unjust for an employer to treat employees
of the same age as having identical physical and mental attributes
merely to satisfy the employer's unwarranted stereotype. There
simply are too many independent variables to permit homogeneous
categorization. Furthermore, the employer cheats himself of pro-
ductive and experienced workers if he uses an arbitrary age in em-
ployment decisions. The employer should, therefore, test
employees individually to appraise each employee's actual ability.
It is likewise unreasonable for the Court to trivialize the antipa-
thy and ambivalence233 historically faced by older persons. At least
228. See, eg., Kay & Birren, Swimming Speed of the Albino Rat: HI Fatigue, Practice, and
Drug Effects on Age and Sex Differences, 13 J. GERONTOLOGY 378, 385 (1958). One research
project found that older adults improve their finger movement flexibility at the same rate as
young adults. Birren & Loucks, supra note 197, at 843.
229. Schaie & Strother, A Cross-Sequential Study of Age Changes in Cognitive Behavior,
70 PSYCH. BULL. 671 (1968). A random sample of 500 persons of different ages and genera-
tions were tested initially and retested seven years later. The retesting revealed only signifi-
cant decrease in ability for two testing variables. Id. at 673. One variable measured
"response" speed. Id. Poor test scores may result more from test rustiness, mental disease or
disuse rather than physiological loss. Birren & Loucks, supra note 197, at 845.
230. See, e.g., Rabbitt, An Age-decrement in the Ability to Ignore Irrelevant Information,
20 J. GERONTOLOGY 233, 236-37 (1965).
231. Birren, Age Decision Strategies, in DECISION MAKING AND AGE 23, 25 (1969).
232. Woodruff & Birren, Age Changes and Cohort Differences in Personality, 6 DEV.
PSYCH. 252, 256 (1972).
233. Levine, supra note 218, at 1108.
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one historian has concluded that "late in the eighteenth century,...
[the] social status of the aged, which had risen for nearly two hun-
dred years, began to fall.... [D]uring the nineteenth century, ex-
pressions of hostility to old age grew steadily stronger in
America." '234 In short, older workers have been relegated to second
class citizenship. If older persons had not suffered from some disa-
bility, Congress would not have felt the need to enact the ADEA
and other age-related legislation.235
A substantial and related problem in the Murgia decision is the
Court's adoption of a dubious and damaging suspect class analysis
when it could have analyzed the mandatory retirement law as a
BFOQ. Because harmful age stereotypes are patently unrelated to
physical and mental ability, the historical hostility buttressing
Murgia's unwillingness to extend equal protection to older employ-
ees is without foundation. As a final aside, there is no reason to
suspect that private employers will be any more charitable in their
treatment of the elderly than they are with other traditionally disad-
vantaged groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, class actions are an ideal way to litigate matters
which affect large numbers of individuals, such as age discrimina-
tion. They avoid multiple suits, promote efficient adjudication, and
permit claims which would be economically unfeasible if brought
individually. This last benefit is particularly important in light of
discovery costs and attorney's fees. Indeed, a plaintiff can often get
a worthy attorney only if he has a class action.
The ADEA was enacted to fight age discrimination, an increas-
ingly necessary task. Although Congress called for an enforcement
mechanism patterned after the FLSA, the legislative history and
evolution of the class action suggest a neutrality toward the use of a
Rule 23 class action. Moreover, public policy requires the most effi-
cient and effective vehicle to fight age discrimination. Employers
may question whether a class action is appropriate in cases where
not all plaintiffs share the same degree of suspect trait (i.e., age), as
plaintiffs in a Title VII action do (e.g., all black or all female), but
this is a question governed by commonality and typicality concerns
in the certification process. It should not be used as an excuse to
frustrate completely the group's ability to remedy past
234. Id. (citing D. FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 224-25 (exp. ed. 1978)).
235. See Eglit, supra note 5, at 885.
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discrimination.2 36
Even if courts disallow a Rule 23 class action in an ADEA suit,
they should still permit notice and independent solicitation. Fur-
thermore, Congress should amend the ADEA to eliminate the opt-
in requirement and provide for notice. It is only through Congres-
sional amendment and liberalized judicial interpretation of the
ADEA that the Act's purpose may be realized. Only by ridding the
job market of stereotyped attitudes against older workers may Sena-
tor Young's characterization of "age" ring true:
We do not grow old merely by living a number of years. Peo-
ple grow old by losing their enthusiasm, deserting their ideals,
236. Nor would there be any danger of abuse if the ADEA adopted an opt-out require-
ment like Rule 23 class actions. First, many courts rule that any plaintiff failing to individu-
ally file a grievance with the EEOC is barred from pursuing a claim either alone or as a
member of a class action. See Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977);
Mitchell v. U.S. Steel Corp., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,103 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (each
individual must file a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC before opting into a class);
McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980) (filing notice with Secretary of
Labor in FLSA case is prerequisite to class certification). Of course, some courts do not
impose such a bar. See, eg., Bean v. Crocker National Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979)
(persons that have not filed notice of intent to sue may be represented by "similarly situated"
grievants); Behr v. Drake Hotel, 586 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (filing requirements sub-
ject to equitable modification); Franci v. Avco Corp., 460 F. Supp. 389 (D. Conn. 1978)
(notice of intent to sue requirement under ADEA is subject to equitable modification); Locas-
cio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (where factual claims of all plaintiffs are
similar, noninclusive notice does not prevent plaintiffs nor exclude others not joined in the
original suit). Even if the plaintiffs file the requisite notice, the tolling of the statute of limita-
tions may act as a further bar. Sussman v. Vornado, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 680 (D.N.J. 1981). But
cf Mahoney v. Crocker Nat. Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (persons desiring to
join the suit have until 90 days before the trial begins); Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of
U.T.C., 431 F. Supp. 793 (D. Conn. 1977) (person representing the class bears the burden of
the filing requirement); Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23 (M.D.N.C. 1977)
(opportunity to join in the class continues until reasonable time before trial).
Section 216(b) of the FLSA also requires plaintiffs to be similarly situated as a class. The
court may seriously restrict a class action by adopting a narrow definition of "similarly situ-
ated." See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Min-
stretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980); Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D.
108 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Some courts allow a broader definition. See Allen v. Marshall Field &
Co., 93 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (affected employees were similarly situated notwithstand-
ing differences in managerial level, geographic locations, and dates on which discrimination
occurred); Behr v. Drake Hotel, 586 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
Finally, the ADEA allows the generous BFOQ defense. If the employer can show that he
felt in good faith that the plaintiff was too old to perform the duties of the particular job, he
may plead this as an affirmative defense. The arbitrariness of age limits that an employer sets
may well depend on the level of skill needed by an employee. For example, an employer
might set lower age limits for an intercity bus driver than for a line worker, and still success-
fully assert a BFOQ defense. Levien, supra note 62, at 238-40. With these procedural pre-
cautions, the prospect of burgeoning age discrimination class actions is too remote to justify
legislative and judicial handwringing on both the opt-in and notice questions. Bold change is
demanded if efforts against institutionalized age discrimination are to be successful.
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abandoning their joy for life, and no longer looking forward to
the challenges of adventure and change.
2§7
DAVID L. BIEK
237. 113 CONG. REc. 31,256 (1967) (statement of Sen. Young).
